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Abstract
Ebola causes severe illness in humans and has epidemic potential. How to deploy vaccines most effectively is a
central policy question since different strategies have implications for ideal vaccine profile. More than one vaccine
may be needed. A vaccine optimised for prophylactic vaccination in high-risk areas but when the virus is not
actively circulating should be safe, well tolerated, and provide long-lasting protection; a two- or three-dose strategy
would be realistic. Conversely, a reactive vaccine deployed in an outbreak context for ring-vaccination strategies
should have rapid onset of protection with one dose, but longevity of protection is less important.
In initial cases, before an outbreak is recognised, healthcare workers (HCWs) are at particular risk of acquiring and
transmitting infection, thus potentially augmenting early epidemics. We hypothesise that many early outbreak cases
could be averted, or epidemics aborted, by prophylactic vaccination of HCWs. This paper explores the potential
impact of prophylactic versus reactive vaccination strategies of HCWs in preventing early epidemic transmissions. To
do this, we use the limited data available from Ebola epidemics (current and historic) to reconstruct transmission
trees and illustrate the theoretical impact of these vaccination strategies. Our data suggest a substantial potential
benefit of prophylactic versus reactive vaccination of HCWs in preventing early transmissions. We estimate that
prophylactic vaccination with a coverage >99 % and theoretical 100 % efficacy could avert nearly two-thirds of
cases studied; 75 % coverage would still confer clear benefit (40 % cases averted), but reactive vaccination would
be of less value in the early epidemic.
A prophylactic vaccination campaign for front-line HCWs is not a trivial undertaking; whether to prioritise
long-lasting vaccines and provide prophylaxis to HCWs is a live policy question. Prophylactic vaccination is
likely to have a greater impact on the mitigation of future epidemics than reactive strategies and, in some
cases, might prevent them. However, in a confirmed outbreak, reactive vaccination would be an essential
humanitarian priority.
The value of HCW Ebola vaccination is often only seen in terms of personal protection of the HCW
workforce. A prophylactic vaccination strategy is likely to bring substantial additional benefit by preventing
early transmission and might abort some epidemics. This has implications both for policy and for the
optimum product profile for vaccines currently in development.
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Background and policy question
Ebola causes severe illness in humans, with a high case-
fatality rate [1–3] and epidemic potential, illustrated by
the recent West African outbreak. There have been 29
outbreaks of Ebola reported since it was first identified
in 1976 (predominantly from Zaire (15) and Sudan (7)
strains, which account for the vast majority of human
disease; Table 1) [1]. The outbreak in West Africa is
larger than all other outbreaks combined, with 28,183
reported cases and 11,306 deaths by 6 September 2015
[4]. The impact on individuals, healthcare, societies, and
economies has been profound.
Preventing and mitigating future epidemics is a public
health priority and an effective vaccine would be an
important tool to respond to future outbreaks. Several
vaccines are currently being trialled or are in develop-
ment. How to deploy any vaccine most effectively is a
central policy question and each strategy has different
implications for ideal vaccine characteristics and profiles.
In this paper, we set out to explore the differential im-
pact and policy implications of two vaccination strategies
of healthcare workers (HCWs) and associated workers:
prophylactic (pre-epidemic) vaccination compared to
reactive vaccination once an epidemic has started.
Prophylactic vaccination would not be a trivial undertak-
ing, so should only be considered if there are potentially
significant benefits.
HCWs1 [5], have a high incidence of severe disease
and deaths from Ebola during epidemics [1], accounting
for up to 25 % of reported cases across historic (smaller)
epidemics [6, 7] and a case attack rate of up to 31 % for
physicians reported in a single epidemic [8]. In the
recent West African outbreak, prior to the provision of
good equipment and precise attention to infection
control procedures, the relative risk for acquiring Ebola
was around 100 times higher for HCWs compared to
the general population [9], although this risk can be
substantially reduced with the correct use of barrier
precautions and personal protective equipment [10, 11].
However, by the time Ebola is suspected, diagnosed, and
precautions implemented, many exposures and infec-
tions have already occurred as the incubation period is
relatively short (2–21 days, average 11 days) [12] and
transmissibility is high from severely ill patients in
healthcare settings. Therefore, in these early stages of an
epidemic, before the outbreak has been recognised,
HCWs not using personal protective equipment are at
substantial risk and often constitute a high proportion of
early cases. There is an obvious humanitarian case to
vaccinate HCWs in potentially affected countries during
an outbreak for their own protection and, if an effective
and relatively safe vaccine exists, there is little doubt it
will be used for this group reactively, so this is not a
major uncertainty for policy. It is less clear whether
prophylactic vaccination between epidemics has a role.
A vaccine optimised for prophylactic vaccination would
have significantly different characteristics to a reactive
vaccine: in particular a prophylactic vaccine would need
to have longevity of protection and few side effects,
whilst a reactive vaccine would have to prioritise speed
of onset of protection.
In many epidemics, HCWs have been the transmission
link to the general population, acting as ‘super-spreaders’
in early epidemics. The importance of this HCW
transmission pathway appears to predominate in early
epidemic transmission chains and decreases as the
epidemic evolves [13, 14], probably due to effective
infection control measures in healthcare settings once
an epidemic is recognised. There are a number of
potential reasons that HCWs are both more likely to
acquire and transmit Ebola. For example, the occupa-
tional risks of acquiring the disease are high, given
close contact with patients who are highly infectious,
but not known to be infectious at the time. Further,
once acquired, there is an increased risk of spreading
infection through societal and cultural factors includ-
ing that HCWs touch a wide variety of strangers,
travel more widely, and may be significant public
figures who have large traditional burials. Therefore,
as they are a high-risk and relatively easily identified
group, it is sensible to consider whether a pre-
epidemic specific vaccination strategy for HCWs
could have an epidemic-modifying role in addition to
a humanitarian one.
Table 1 Chronology of Ebola Zaire strain outbreaks [1, 4]
Country Outbreak location Year Number
of cases
Number
of deaths
Democratic Republic
of Congo (DRC)
Yambuku 1976 318 280
DRC Tandala 1997 1 1
Gabon Mekouka 1994 52 31
DRC Kikwit 1995 315 254
Gabon Mayibout 1996 37 21
Gabon Booue 1996 60 45
Gabon Mekambo 2001–02 65 53
Republic of the
Congo (RC)
Mbomo Kelle 2001–02 57 43
RC Kelle 2003 143 128
RC Mbandza Mbomo 2003 35 29
RC Etoumbi 2005 12 10
DRC Luebo 2007 264 187
DRC Mweka and Luebo 2008–09 32 15
DRC Jeera 2014 66 49
Multiple countries [4] West Africa 2014–15 28,183 11,306
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Partly as a result of Ebola being recognised as a poten-
tial bioterrorism agent [15, 16], vaccine development
work had begun prior to the recent outbreak. Potential
vaccines exist for both the Zaire and Sudan Ebola virus
strains. Recent events in West Africa increased the ur-
gency for an Ebola vaccine and fast-track clinical trials
were undertaken [17–19]. Initial data from early trials,
recent publication of interim analyses, and non-human
primate studies suggest the vaccines are safe, efficacious,
and have the potential to be effective at a population
level [18, 20, 21]. However, additional evidence from
final analyses and the completion of Phase II/III human
trials will still be required. Due to the rapidly falling case
numbers, efficacy data will probably be limited and vac-
cine efficacy largely inferred from a non-outbreak setting
and immunological correlates of protection.
Whilst the ideal Ebola vaccine would be safe, well tol-
erated, rapidly effective, and have long duration of high
levels of protection, in reality, there may well be a trade-
off between different characteristics (e.g. tolerability ver-
sus speed of onset versus duration of protection) and
more than one vaccine may be needed. At least four
possible vaccination strategies are under consideration,
which have different ideal vaccine profiles:
(1)Ring vaccination of the contacts of cases. This needs
to be rapidly effective; duration of protection would
be less important. Initial data already supports this
approach [20].
(2)Mass vaccination of the general population during
an outbreak. Here safety and ease of use (e.g. single
dose) would dominate as essential characteristics.
(3)Reactive vaccination of HCWs caring for patients
during an epidemic. The speed of onset of protection
and efficacy would be essential given the high risk of
transmission; duration of protection beyond a few
months and a minor side effect profile would be less
important given the high risks associated with
infection.
(4)Vaccination of HCWs in countries where Ebola is
potentially endemic prior to an outbreak as a
prophylactic measure. Unlike other vaccination
strategies, duration of protection would be central
and safety and tolerability would be much more
important as it is likely that most vaccinated HCWs
would never work in an outbreak setting (rare
events) and, therefore, not encounter the virus.
Speed of onset of protection would be less important
and a two- or three-dose vaccine strategy would be
reasonable. Therefore, this strategy could be considered
as an outlier in terms of vaccine profile.
There is no question that, if an effective vaccine is de-
veloped, it will be used reactively to vaccinate HCWs in
an epidemic. However, we hypothesised that the magni-
tude of outbreaks could be significantly reduced, or even
aborted at an early stage, with prophylactic pre-epidemic
protection of HCWs. This has to be predicated on a
long-lasting, well-tolerated vaccine being available.
Given the current speed of development of vaccines and
policy, the aim of this paper is a rapid analysis of known
and provisional Ebola transmission tree data to assess
what could have happened if prophylactic vaccination
(4) versus reactive vaccination (3) strategies for HCWs
had been deployed and the impact this would have had
in preventing early epidemic transmissions and epidemic
progression. To inform the debate, descriptive hypoth-
esis generation and illustrative testing of different vac-
cination strategies for HCWs were undertaken to see if a
long-duration vaccine for prophylactic use is sufficiently
attractive to be worth prioritising due to its impact on
transmission of early epidemics, as compared to reactive
vaccination.
Methods
Data providing illustrative examples
To examine the hypothesis that prophylactic vaccination
could have a significant epidemic-modifying impact on
early epidemic transmission, we used data available from
the current and historic Ebola epidemics. The methods
and search strategy for the review are detailed in Table 2
and Fig. 1. From the articles identified [2, 6, 22–44] we
reconstructed the initial epidemic transmission trees for
all available previous outbreaks of Ebola Zaire virus, ini-
tially using published and grey literature and, where
these were not available, press reports (see Additional
file 1). The transmission trees detail the number of cases
as well as who transmitted the virus to whom, and
HCW status where known. Therefore, it is possible to
estimate the number of cases that resulted from HCW
transmission. These transmission trees were then used
to assess the proportion of the early known Ebola epi-
demic cases that would have been averted under various
vaccination strategies if HCWs had been protected and
had not contributed to transmission chains.
Of the 15 Zaire strain Ebola virus outbreaks, initial
epidemic transmission trees of varying detail were pos-
sible to reconstruct for eight outbreaks. Only two studies
outlined transmission trees directly (Guinea and Nigeria
epidemics of the West Africa outbreak [22, 23]), while
all others were constructed using multiple data sources
and linking this information to reconstruct a ‘best ap-
proximation’ tree. For many of the historical outbreaks
there was no detailed person-to-person transmission in-
formation to enable construction of transmission trees,
only hypothetical transmission scenarios which were sub-
sequently excluded. Therefore, our main testing of the hy-
pothesis is based on three outbreaks: the recent outbreak
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Table 2 Methods and search strategy for review and transmission tree reconstruction
Methods
Search strategy A compound search strategy was developed to identify all relevant open-source articles regardless of publication status.
The initial search was undertaken via PubMed using the search terms outlined below. Further information was obtained
by reviewing article bibliographies for relevant citations and a Google search to find open-source published articles,
press articles, and other grey literature including outbreak updates, WHO roadmaps, WHO situation reports, and Morbidity
and Mortality Weekly Reports from the Centres for Disease Control.
The purpose of the review is to outline potential policy implications for vaccine development, as opposed to defining
detailed epidemic trees.
Search terms used Key words: Ebola, Ebola haemorrhagic fever, Ebolavirus, Ebola virus disease, transmission, transmission trees, epidemic,
epidemic trees.
(("hemorrhagic fever, Ebola"[MeSH Terms] OR ("hemorrhagic"[All Fields] AND "fever"[All Fields] AND "Ebola"[All Fields])
OR "Ebola hemorrhagic fever"[All Fields] OR
"Ebola"[All Fields] OR "Ebolavirus"[MeSH Terms] OR "Ebolavirus"[All Fields]) OR ("hemorrhagic fever, Ebola"[MeSH Terms]
OR ("hemorrhagic"[All Fields] AND "fever"[All Fields] AND "Ebola"[All Fields]) OR "Ebola hemorrhagic fever"[All Fields]
OR ("Ebola"[All Fields] AND "virus"[All Fields] AND "disease"[All Fields]) OR "Ebola virus disease"[All Fields])) AND
((("transmission"[Subheading] OR "transmission"[All Fields]) AND ("trees"[MeSH Terms] OR "trees"[All Fields] OR
"tree"[All Fields])) OR (("epidemics"[MeSH Terms] OR "epidemics"[All Fields] OR "epidemic"[All Fields]) AND
("trees"[MeSH Terms] OR "trees"[All Fields] OR "tree"[All Fields])))
Inclusion criteria Studies and articles were eligible for inclusion if they reported human-to-human transmission chains and initial
transmission chains from the primary or index case within each outbreak or country in multi-location epidemics.
Details of occupational exposure of individuals in the transmission trees were also included where possible. There were
no restrictions with regards to date of publication. The aim was to identify as many early epidemic trees as possible,
and to include all which could be reliably identified as including HCW status to minimise bias.
Data extraction Data extraction was first undertaken using peer-reviewed literature. These data were supplemented by grey
literature and press articles to add further information and fill in the gaps for the epidemic tree construction.
Approximate numbers have been used where precise numbers were not available, but in all cases conservative
assumptions have been made to avoid overestimation of any effects identified.
Data analysis Initial analyses of the different vaccination strategies were undertaken in Microsoft Excel (2010). Using the initial
transmission trees constructed, the number of cases that developed the disease and the number of cases averted
were calculated for each vaccination strategy. All results are given as a percentage of averted cases by the total
number of cases. The results are given per vaccination strategy and epidemic location.
Fig. 1 PRISMA Flow Diagram
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in West Africa (including all nine countries in which cases
have occurred, each considered as a separate transmission
tree based on an imported primary case); and two histor-
ical outbreaks (one with two separate transmission trees
from two geographically distinct outbreaks, but originat-
ing from the same source)(all transmission trees used in
the illustrative analysis are included in Additional file 1).
The historical outbreaks were selected according to those
outbreaks with transmission trees detailed enough to
allow the proposed analysis (Yambuku 1976, Kikwit 1995,
and Mosango 1995). Transmission trees from later in the
outbreak are available but have not been included as this
study focuses on early transmission. It is clear that once
an epidemic is established, spread from HCWs (as op-
posed to spread to HCWs) becomes a minor route of
transmission with transmission by other means, such as
burials and community transmission, predominating [13].
Therefore, vaccination of HCWs in this later epidemic set-
ting, whether prophylactic or reactive, would have a min-
imal impact on the epidemic.
Our analysis investigates four different vaccination
strategies of HCWs to illustrate the impact of a prophy-
lactic versus a solely reactive HCW vaccination strategy:
Strategy 1
Prospective prophylactic vaccination of all front-line
HCWs in high-priority areas prior to an epidemic
and those likely to be deployed to epidemic areas, as-
suming >99 % vaccination coverage and vaccination
efficacy. In this idealised scenario, all cases of HCW
infection were prevented, as were the cases arising
from transmission by HCWs.
Strategy 2
Prophylactic vaccination as above with only 75 % cover-
age (more realistic). As not all HCWs are vaccinated in
this scenario the anticipated outcome of the vaccination
strategy varied depending on which HCWs were not
vaccinated. In all transmission trees the HCWs chosen
for vaccination were those associated with the fewest
linked transmission cases, except in the situation in
which a HCW was not documented to have transmitted
the disease. For example, where 75 % vaccine coverage is
analysed, the 25 % of HCWs (i.e. one in four) in the
transmission tree who were not vaccinated were deliber-
ately selected to minimize the number of cases averted.
This method minimises the possibility of overestimating
the efficacy of a vaccination strategy by giving the most
conservative estimates (‘worst case scenario’ with the
highest onward transmission occurring).
Strategy 3
Reactive rapid vaccination of all front-line HCWs once an
epidemic has been identified. We assume an (optimistic)
lag-time of 42-days from case presentation to immune
protection from vaccine response. This is based on a 28-
day logistical window from epidemic identification to
initiation of a vaccination campaign, followed by a 14-day
lag-time for immune protection following vaccination.
This is inferred from the recent interim report of the
Guinea ring vaccination cluster-randomised trial of an
rVSV-vectored vaccine expressing Ebola surface glycopro-
tein in which there were no cases reported 10 days after
vaccination, implying immune protection [20]. To calcu-
late the cases averted by reactive vaccination, the dates of
infection were analysed. Any HCW presenting more than
42 days after the date of the index case was considered to
be potentially vaccinated and protected, thus preventing
infection and any subsequent transmission.
Strategy 4
Extension of strategy 1 (prophylactic vaccination) to in-
clude traditional healers as well as front-line HCWs.
Therefore, all cases of HCWs, traditional healers, and
subsequent ongoing transmission from both these groups
would be prevented.
Results
Figures 2 and 3 shows visual examples of epidemic trees
and the analysis undertaken, and illustrates the potential
impact of each vaccination strategy on transmission.
Table 3 shows the putative impact of the first three vaccin-
ation strategies outlined by epidemic location. It details
the cases averted had HCWs been vaccinated and there-
fore protected:
Strategy 1
Approximately two-thirds (65 %, 73/115) of early epidemic
cases across three different epidemics (and 12 outbreak
locations) would have been averted with prophylactic
vaccination of HCWs and a vaccination coverage >99 %.
Across all epidemics, this strategy decreased early epidemic
transmission by between 38–100 %. The Sierra Leone data
[29–31] suggest that at least 25 % (125/506) of early trans-
missions would have been averted with this strategy, but as
this is based on gross approximate numbers with which we
were unable to construct a transmission tree, these figures
have not been included in our analysis.
Strategy 2
We assume prophylactic vaccination of approximately
75 % of HCWs. This strategy would have averted 42 %
(58/138) of epidemic cases. Across all epidemics, the per-
centage of cases averted ranged from 11–74 %. There will
be a drop-off point in which vaccine coverage falls below
critical levels, but further work would be needed to model
this. This data is based on only two outbreaks (West
Africa and Mosango) [22–38, 44] as the other historical
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Fig. 2 An example of epidemic transmission trees and the impact of four different vaccination strategies on the transmission chains. Guinea 2014
outbreak [22]
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outbreaks did not provide enough detailed transmission
data to determine exact transmission chains with relation
to HCW status.
Strategy 3
A reactive vaccination strategy was assessed. This strat-
egy was unable to prevent any early cases (0 %, 0/609)
and was, therefore, ineffective at mitigating epidemics
based on this study data. As only initial transmission
trees were used, most of the data does not extend past
the third wave of infections and does not detail trans-
mission events after 42 days to fully assess the impact of
this strategy on later epidemic transmission.
Strategy 4
When the vaccination strategy included traditional healers,
the effect was context-dependent. It had a potentially large
effect (63–100 %) in two regions of the current West Africa
epidemic, Sierra Leone and Mali [29–34], but did not
appear to have an effect in the majority of locations. Based
on this limited information, it is difficult to draw conclusions.
These findings suggest that prophylactic vaccination of
HCWs might have led to a significant reduction, or even
avoidance, of epidemics by preventing the early epidemic
transmissions and the subsequent snowballing cascade
which resulted in the exponential growth of cases. A re-
active vaccination strategy would have had little impact
on the first few of waves of the initial epidemic, and by
the time a reactive strategy was effective, a much smaller
proportion of transmission (minimal in large epidemics)
would be from HCWs.
Discussion
We hypothesize, and illustrate using data, that prophy-
lactic vaccination of HCWs could have a substantial
epidemic-reducing effect. Reactive vaccination of HCWs
Fig. 3 An example of epidemic transmission trees and the impact of four different vaccination strategies on the transmission chains. Nigeria 2014
epidemic [23]
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is of limited value in preventing early disease transmis-
sion, although reactive vaccination would be an essential
humanitarian priority to protect HCWs and maintain
the workforce key to controlling any epidemic [9].
Ring-vaccination of cases may well be effective, but even
if available, may well not be deployed early in new
epidemics and certainly not until the epidemic is recog-
nised and hence potentially already spreading. A prophy-
lactic vaccination campaign, with a vaccine providing
long-lasting immunity for all front-line HCWs, either in
Ebola epidemic risk areas or where Ebola is present in
animal reservoirs, should be seriously considered. It is
likely to have a profound impact on the prevention of
future outbreaks and epidemics. In some cases, it might
stop them completely since, during the early phases of
an epidemic (as opposed to later once the epidemic has
been recognised), a very large proportion of transmission
is via HCWs. Once an epidemic becomes established,
the proportion of transmission via HCWs decreases
rapidly.
In practical terms, >99 % vaccination coverage equates
to approximately 7,400 HCWs (physicians, nurses, and
midwives) across Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, in a
population of nearly 22 million [45]. The numbers would
be much higher for the wider potentially endemic
region. Although it is not a light undertaking, even if a
vaccine were available, the huge impact that the recent
epidemic had on the lives, healthcare systems, and econ-
omies of affected countries, coupled with the risk to the
wider world, makes this a worthwhile proposition. A
prophylactic vaccination campaign for HCWs, as op-
posed to the general population, would be easier to
administer, more likely to be acceptable, and have
higher uptake rates. An example of such a strategy is
Hepatitis B vaccination of HCWs in many countries.
Whether it could be cost-effective will depend on vaccine
efficacy, duration of protection, and pricing structure.
However, as these parameters are not currently available,
any modelling of this would have little practical use.
Nonetheless, based on the illustrative data, investing in
developing vaccines with the relevant characteristics
(longevity of protection and good side-effect profiles),
even if multi-dose, seems a reasonable decision.
Many of the historical outbreaks have been so rural
that formal HCWs were not involved in the initial
chain of transmission; instead transmission may be via
traditional healers and community workers who play a
substantial role in healthcare provision and community
structure. We have been unable reliably to assess the role
of traditional healers in epidemic transmissions due to the
Table 3 Indicative proportion of early outbreak prevented by implementing different vaccination strategies: prospective versus
reactive vaccination of healthcare workers
Percentage of initial outbreak prevented by vaccination strategy
Epidemic Country Total number
of cases [4]
Total number
of deaths [4]
Cases included
in epidemic tree
Strategy 1: Vaccinate
prophylactically
(100 % coverage)
Strategy 2: Vaccinate
prophylactically approx.
75 % of HCWs
Strategy 3: Vaccinate
reactively (lag-time
42 days)
2014 West Africa Guinea [22] 3,792 2,530 71 61 % (43/71) 36.6 % (26/71) 0
Liberia [24–28] 10,672 4,808 9 67 % (6/9) 11 % (1/9) 0
Sierra Leone
[29–31]
13,683 3,953 NR NR NR 0
Nigeria [23] 20 8 20 80 % (16/20) 50 %(10/20) 0
Mali [32–34] 8 6 8 38 % (3/8) 13 % (1/8) 0
USA [35] 4 1 4 75 % (3/4) 50 % (2/4) 0
UK [36] and
Spain [37]
2 0 2 100 % (2/2) 50 % (1/2) 0
Senegal [38] 1 0 1 0 0 0
Overall 28,183 11,306 115 63.5 % (73/115) 35.7 % (41/115)
(95 % confidence
interval)
(0.54–0.72) (0.27–0.45)
Historic outbreaks Kikwit [6, 39–43] 315 250 9 100 % (9/9) NR NR
Mosango [44] 23 18 23 100 % (23/23) 74 % (17/23) NR
Yambuku [2] 318 280 45 44 % (20/45) NR NR
Total 192 65.1 % (125/192) 42.0 % (58/138) 0.0 % (0/609)
(95 % confidence
interval)
(0.58–0.72) (0.34–0.51)
Cases numbers accurate as of 06/09/2015
NR, Not reported
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paucity of reliable data. However, there is an argument for
further investigation of targeted vaccination campaigns of
these providers, particularly in known ‘at risk’ areas or
reactively after the onset of an outbreak in a nearby area.
For example, in Sierra Leone, traditional healers play an
integral role in healthcare and community structure and,
based on the limited data available [29–31], appear to have
acted as early ‘super-spreaders’ of infection.
There are inevitably several limitations to the illustra-
tive analysis that backs up this policy paper. The main
one is the paucity of open-access data and the inevitable
incompleteness of epidemic trees. The analysis is, there-
fore, based on a small number of outbreaks with limited
information. Furthermore, reported transmission events
are biased towards larger events and hospital-based
events, meaning HCW association may be over-represented.
Finally, the definition of HCWs varies and there is a lack of
data regarding the number of HCWs and the specific
capacity in which they were working; this makes a denomin-
ator difficult to estimate.
In the analysis we assume that outbreaks originate
from one single introduction of the virus in to the hu-
man population. We believe this to be true in most, but
not all, epidemics. Furthermore, we assume there is no
significant transmission from asymptomatic individuals,
an area of debate in the literature [46]. The assumption
of 100 % efficacy for vaccines is, of course, not meant as
a formal model of actual impact as the data are not there
to support this. Rather it is to illustrate that prophylactic
vaccination, if effective, could have effects very different
to reactive vaccination of HCWs. A less efficacious
vaccine at a higher than 75 % coverage would also have
significant effect (data not shown).
This study is intended neither as a fully detailed policy
review of all vaccination strategies, nor as a model-based
evaluation of different vaccination strategies, but rather to
address a single question: should prophylactic vaccination
of HCWs, which would require a long-lasting and rela-
tively safe vaccine (but would not require a single-shot or
rapidly acting vaccine), be considered as part of the policy
process and desirable product profile for Ebola vaccines?
Conclusion
Serious consideration of a prophylactic HCW Ebola vac-
cination strategy is needed in countries at threat from
Ebola epidemics if a long-protecting vaccine can be
developed. The value of vaccinating HCWs is often seen
solely in terms of personal protection and maintenance
of the health (and morale) of HCWs, where a reactive
vaccination strategy would be sufficient if a fast-acting
vaccine is available. However, our analysis of the (lim-
ited) available empirical data suggests that a prophylactic
strategy could bring substantial additional benefits by
preventing chains of early transmission before the risk of
epidemic spread is recognised.
Endnote
1The definition of a HCW varies considerably. In this
review, we define HCWs as ‘all people engaged in the
promotion, protection, or improvement of the health of
the population’. Healthcare management and hospital
support staff are not included as they do not routinely
have direct clinical contact with patients of the sort
which tends to increase risk of acquiring Ebola.
Additional file
Additional file 1: Transmission trees used in illustrative analysis.
(DOC 169 kb)
Competing interests
AMJ is a governor of the Wellcome Trust. CJMW was Chief Scientific Adviser
for the UK Department for International Development (DFID). The authors
have no other conflicts of interest to declare.
Authors’ contributions
CJMW and CEMC conceptualised the idea. CEMC developed the protocol,
conducted the searches and undertook the analysis. CEMC wrote the paper
with input from AMJ and CJMW. All authors read and approved the final
version of the manuscript.
Acknowledgements
We would like to pay tribute to the many African and international
healthcare workers who at considerable personal risk acted to control the
current Ebola epidemic in West Africa.
Funding
CEMC is funded by the Wellcome Trust (Grant code:106551/Z/14/A). The
funding body was not involved in the design, interpretation, and decision to
submit the article.
Author details
1Research Department of Infection and Population Health, Institute of
Epidemiology, UCL, London, UK. 2Clinical Research Department, London
School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine, London, UK.
Received: 16 July 2015 Accepted: 3 September 2015
References
1. World Health Organization. Ebola virus disease: Fact sheet.
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs103/en/.
Accessed 17 December 2014.
2. World Health Organization. Ebola haemorrhagic fever in Zaire, 1976. Bull World
Health Organ. 1978;56:247–70.
3. Dowell SF, Mukunu R, Ksiazek TG, Khan AS, Rollin PE, Peters CJ. Transmission
of Ebola hemorrhagic fever: a study of risk factors in family members, Kikwit,
Democratic Republic of the Congo, 1995. J Infect Dis. 1999;179:S87–91.
4. World Health Organization. Ebola response roadmap: Situation response.
Update (05/07/2015). http://apps.who.int/ebola/ebola-situation-reports.
Accessed 11 July 2015.
5. World Health Organization. Counting health workers: definitions, data,
methods and global results. http://www.who.int/hrh/documents/
counting_health_workers.pdf. Accessed 20 February 2015.
6. Khan AS, Kweteming TF, Heymann DL, Le Guenno B, Nabeth P, Kerstiëns B,
et al. The reemergence of Ebola hemorrhagic fever, Democratic Republic of
the Congo, 1995. Commission de Lutte contre les Epidémies à Kikwit.
J Infect Dis. 1999;179:S76–86.
Coltart et al. BMC Medicine  (2015) 13:271 Page 9 of 10
7. Casillas AM, Nyamathi AM, Sosa A, Wilder CL, Sands H. A current review of
Ebola virus: pathogenesis, clinical presentation and diagnostic assessment.
Biol Res Nurs. 2003;4:268–75.
8. Tomori O, Bertolli J, Rollin PE, Fleerackers Y, Guimard Y, De Roo A, et al.
Serologic survey among hospital and health center workers during the
Ebola haemorrhagic fever outbreak in Kikwit, Democratic Republic of the
Congo, 1995. J Infect Dis. 1999;179:S98–S101.
9. Kilmarx PH, Clarke KR, Dietz PM, Hamel MJ, Husain F, McFadden JD, et al. Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Ebola virus disease in health care
workers–Sierra Leone, 2014. MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep. 2014;63:1168–70.
10. World Health Organizaton. Personal protective equipment in the
context of filovirus disease outbreak response. http://apps.who.int/iris/
bitstream/10665/137410/1/WHO_EVD_Guidance_PPE_14.1_eng.pdf?ua=1.
Accessed 24 February 2015.
11. Wamala JF, Lukwago L, Malimbo M, Nguku P, Yoti Z, Musenero M, et
al. Ebola haemorrhagic fever associated with novel virus strain, Uganda,
2007–2008. Emerg Infect Dis. 2003;9:1430–7.
12. Ebola Response Team WHO. Ebola virus disease in West Africa — The first
9 months of the epidemic and forward projections. N Engl J Med.
2014;371:1481–95.
13. Faye O, Boelle P, Heleze E, Faye O, Loucoubar C, Magassouba N, et al.
Chains of transmission and control of Ebola virus disease in Conakry,
Guinea, in 2014: an observational study. Lancet Infect Dis. 2015;15:320–6.
doi:10.1016/S1473-3099(14)71088-6.
14. Merler S, Ajelli M, Fumanelli L, Gomes MF, Piontti AP, Rossi L, et al.
Spatiotemporal spread of the 2014 outbreak of Ebola virus disease in
Liberia and the effectiveness of non-pharmaceutical interventions: a
computational modelling analysis. Lancet Infect Dis. 2015;15:204–11.
15. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Bioterrorism agents/diseases.
http://emergency.cdc.gov/agent/agentlist-category.asp. Accessed 24
February 2015.
16. Borio L, Inglesby T, Peters CJ, Schmaljohn AL, Hughes JM, Jahrling PB, et al.
Working Group on Civilian Biodefense. Hemorrhagic fevers viruses as
biological weapons: medical and public health management. JAMA.
2002;287:2391–405.
17. Rampling T, Ewer K, Bowyer G, Wright D, Imoukhuede EB, Payne R, et al. A
monovalent chimpanzee adenovirus Ebola vaccine – preliminary report.
N Engl J Med. 2015. Ahead of print. doi:10.1056/NEJMoa1411627.
18. Marzi A, Feldmann F, Geisbert TW, Feldmann H, Safronetz D. Vesicular
stomatitis virus-based vaccines against Lassa and Ebola viruses. Emerg
Infect Dis. 2015;21:305–7.
19. LSHTM. Ebola vaccine trail funding announced by the Innovative Medicines
Initiative. http://www.lshtm.ac.uk/newsevents/news/2015/ebola_vaccine_
trial_funding.html. Accessed 24 February 2015.
20. Henao-Restrepo AM, Longini IR, Egger M, Dean NE, Edmunds WJ, Camacho A,
et al. Efficacy and effectiveness of an rVSV-vectored vaccine expressing Ebola
surface glycoprotein:interim results from the Guinea ring vaccination cluster-
randomised trial. Lancet. 2015;386:857–66.
21. Jones SM, Feldmann H, Stroher U, Geisbert JB, Fernando L, Grolla A, et al.
Live attenuated recombinant vaccine protects non-human primates against
Ebola and Marburg viruses. Nat Med. 2005;11:786–90.
22. Baize S, Pannetier D, Oestereich L, Rieger T, Koivogui L, Magassouba N, et al.
Emergence of Zaire Ebola Virus Disease in Guinea. N Engl J Med.
2014;371:1418–25.
23. Fasina FO, Shittu A, Lazarus D, Tomori O, Simonsen L, Viboud C, et al.
Transmission dynamics and control of Ebola virus disease outbreak in
Nigeria, July to September 2014. Euro Surveill. 2014;19:20920.
24. BBC News. Ebola: Liberia confirms cases, Senegal shuts border. http://
www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-26735118. Accessed 30 January 2015.
25. BBC News. Seven die in Monrovia Ebola outbreak. http://www.bbc.co.uk/
news/world-africa-27888363. Accessed 30 January 2015.
26. Africa Online News. Ebola deaths turn Redemption Hospital into ghost
town. http://frontpageafricaonline.com/index.php/health-sci/1987-ebola-
deaths-turn-liberia-s-redemption-hospital-into-ghost-town. Accessed 30
January 2015.
27. All Africa News. Liberia: Ebola kills doctor at Redemption Hospital.
http://allafrica.com/stories/201407021024.html. Accessed 30 January 2015.
28. All Africa News. Liberia: Four nurses in Ebola web at Phebe Hospital.
http://allafrica.com/stories/201407211455.html. Accessed 30 January 2015.
29. Schieffelin JS, Shaffer JG, Goba A, Gbakie M, Gire SK, Colubri A, et al. KGH
Lassa Fever Program; Viral Hemorrhagic Fever Consortium; WHO Clinical
Response Team Clinical illness and outcomes in patients with Ebola in
Sierra Leone. N Engl J Med. 2014;371:2092–100.
30. Gire SK, Goba A, Andersen KG, Sealfon RS, Park DJ, Kanneh L, et al. Genomic
surveillance elucidates Ebola virus origin and transmission during the 2014
outbreak. Science. 2014;345:1369–72.
31. World Health Organization. Sierra Leone: a traditional healer and a funeral.
http://www.who.int/csr/disease/ebola/ebola-6-months/sierra-leone/en/.
Accessed 3 July 2015.
32. World Health Organization. Mali: Details of the additional cases of Ebola
virus disease. http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/ebola/20-november-
2014-mali/en/. Accessed 30 January 2015.
33. Reuters. Mali says has no remaining Ebola cases as last patient recovers.
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/12/11/us-health-ebola-mali-
idUSKBN0JP2HG20141211. Accessed 30 January 2015.
34. Reuters. Doctor who treated source of second Mali Ebola outbreak dies.
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/11/20/health-ebola-mali-
idUSL6N0TA62R20141120. Accessed 30 January 2015.
35. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Cases of Ebola diagnosed in
the United States. http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/outbreaks/2014-west-
africa/united-states-imported-case.html. Accessed 12 January 2015.
36. WHO. Ebola virus disease – United Kingdom. http://www.who.int/csr/don/
30-december-2014-ebola/en/. Accessed 30 January 2015.
37. BBC News. Ebola outbreak: nurse infected in Spain. http://www.bbc.co.uk/
news/world-europe-29514920. Accessed 30 January 2015.
38. World Health Organization. The outbreak of Ebola virus disease in Senegal is
over. http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/ebola/17-october-2014/en/.
Accessed 30 January 2015.
39. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Outbreak of Ebola viral
hemorrhagic fever – Zaire, 1995. MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep.
1995;44:381–2.
40. Muyembe T, Kipasa M. Ebola haemorrhagic fever in Kikwit, Zaire. Lancet.
1995;345:1448.
41. Hall RC, Hall RC, Chapman M. The 1995 Kikwit Ebola outbreak: lessons
hospitals and physicians can apply to future viral epidemics. Gen Hosp
Psych. 2008;30:446–52.
42. Muyembe-Tamfum JJ, Mulangu S, Masumu J, Kayembe JM, Kemp A,
Paweska JT. Ebola virus outbreaks in Africa: Past and Present. Onderst J Vet
Res. 2012;79:451–8.
43. Reiter P, Turell M, Coleman R. Field investigations of an outbreak of Ebola
hemorrhagic fever, Kikwit, Democratic Republic of the Congo, 1995:
arthropod studies. J Infect Dis. 1999;179:S148–54.
44. Ndambi R, Akamituna P, Bonnet M, Tukadila AM, Muyembe-Tamfum JJ,
Colebunders R. Epidemiologic and clinical aspects of the Ebola virus
epidemic in Mosango, Democratic Republic of the Congo, 1995. J Infect Dis.
1999;179:S8–S10.
45. World Health Organization. Global Atlas of the Health Workforce. Global
Health Observatory Data Repository. http://apps.who.int/gho/data/
node.main.A1444?lang=en&showonly=HWF. Accessed 30 January 2015.
46. Leroy EM, Baize S, Volchkov VE, Fisher-Hoch SP. Human asymptomatic Ebola
infection and strong inflammatory response. Lancet. 2000;355:2210–5.
Submit your next manuscript to BioMed Central
and take full advantage of: 
• Convenient online submission
• Thorough peer review
• No space constraints or color ﬁgure charges
• Immediate publication on acceptance
• Inclusion in PubMed, CAS, Scopus and Google Scholar
• Research which is freely available for redistribution
Submit your manuscript at 
www.biomedcentral.com/submit
Coltart et al. BMC Medicine  (2015) 13:271 Page 10 of 10
